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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN W. HANSEN and 
BEVERLY M. HANSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
REUEL S. KOHLER and 
DOLORES M. KOHLER, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
EARSEL G. PIERCE and 
PATRICIA B. PIERCE, his wife, 
Intervening Defendants 
and Cross Claimants. 
Case No. 14099 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS KOHLER 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to compel reconveyance of real pro-
perty previously deeded to respondents Kohler, or to recover 
its net value, on the ground that the conveyance to the 
Kohlers was as security only. Intervening defendants sought 
damages from the Kohlers for breach of warranty, and against 
the plaintiffs for slander of title. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial, the court dismissed the action and the 
breach of warranty claim; and held plaintiffs liable for 
damages to the intervenors. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents Reuel S. and Dolores M. Kohler seek 
affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Reuel S. Kohler is a licensed real estate 
broker. In February/ 1969, Kohler acted as broker for Kent 
Robinson in the sale of a four-plex in Salt Lake City. By 
the terms of an Earnest Money Agreement of February 28f 
1969 (Exhibit 1), plaintiff Marvin W. Hansen agreed to pur-
chase the four-plex for the price of $39,400.00, with a 
down payment of $7,500.00 represented by a conveyance of 
Hansen's home and land in Howell, Utah. Hansen further 
agreed to pay the present mortgage of $200.00 per month, 
$110.00 per month on Robinsons1 equity and a $2,000.00 
balloon payment on or before May 15, 1969. Kohler was to 
receive a six percent commission ($2,364.00) from Robinson 
for his services. 
Thereafter, on April 1, 1969, a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (Exhibit 2) was entered into between the Hansens 
and Robinsons containing the same essential terms included 
in the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Mr. Robinson desired to sell the four-plex but did not 
want the Howell property. The Robinsons and Kohlers 
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therefore entered into a collateral agreement whereby the 
Kohlers would receive the Howell property in exchange for 
Mr. Kohler's agreement to waive the real estate commission 
and to pay Robinson $2,000.00 (Tr. 23, Exhibit 6). 
On April 2, 1969, in furtherance of that agreement, 
the Hansens executed a warranty deed (Exhibit 3) conveying 
the Howell property to the Kohlers. Robinson understood that 
the conveyance was to transfer the property to the Kohlers 
absolutely (Tr. 23). 
Subsequently, a title search disclosed that the Howell 
property was subject to a $19,000.00 mortgage (Tr. 13, 23, 
36), and it was necessary to make some changes in the trans-
action. On April 28, 1969, a supplemental agreement (Ex-
hibit 7) was executed. The Hansens agreed to pre-pay to the 
Robinsons $1,000.00 of the $2,000.00 due on May 15, 1969, 
to manifest their good faith. On June 12, 1969, the Hansens 
and Robinsons signed another agreement (Exhibit 8), intended 
to amend the April 1, 1969, contract as to the manner of the 
down payment: 
1. Sellers agree to accept as part of 
down payment a 1967 Ford Thunderbird auto-
mobile. Buyer agrees to pay any and all 
indebtedness off against said vehicle, and 
transfer clear title to sellers. 
2. Buyers agree to transfer title to 
home and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S. 
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Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife. 
Warranty deed was executed 1 April 1969. 
3. It is considered that Mr. Hansen 
has made the May payment of $310.00. 
Buyers and sellers agree that this to-
gether with other terms defined in said 
contract constitutes the down payment. 
Notwithstanding this agreement, the Hansens claimed that 
the conveyance to the Kohlers was only as security for the 
real estate commission (Tr. 30). The claim, however, is 
contrary to the evidence presented by Mr. Hansen. 
After the transaction, the parties1 conduct was consis-
tent with an absolute conveyance, but inconsistent with a 
mortgage. 
There was no note to evidence an obligation to pay the 
real estate commission (Tr. 30); no discussion of interest 
on the obligation (Tr. 31); no time for payment was agreed 
upon (Tr. 31); the Kohlers were given possession of the pro-
perty (Tr. 32); they put a tenant in the property and were 
permitted to collect the rents (Tr. 35); and tax notices 
received by the Hansens were delivered to the Kohlers for 
payment (Tr. 34). 
The Kohlers conveyed the property to Earsel G. Pierce 
and Patricia B. Pierce, the intervening defendants and cross 
claimants herein, on October 18, 1971 (Exhibit 12). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTY DEED TRANSFERRING THE HOWELL PROPERTY TO 
THE KOHLERS WAS NOT INTENDED AS A SECURITY INSTRUMENT. 
The crucial factor in determining whether the con-
veyance of the Howell property to the Kohlers was absolute 
or as security is the intention of the parties at the time 
of execution and delivery of the warranty deed. Kjar v. 
Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972). The undisputed 
testimony of Mr. Hansen indicates the absolute nature of the 
transfer: 
Q: When you first entered into this trans-
action with Robinson, there was no ques-
tion in your mind, was there, that you 
were going to transfer the Howell house? 
A. None whatsoever. 
Q. Absolutely? 
A. True. 
Q. You were to have no interest in that? 
A. Right. (Tr. 22). 
At the time of the transfer the Hansens knew of the 
transaction between the Kohlers and Mr. Robinson under which 
the Kohlers would acquire the Howell property: 
Q. What did they tell you [as to why you were 
conveying the property to Mr. and Mrs. 
Kohler instead of the Robinsons]? 
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A. They told me they had a little deal 
of their own pertaining to this pro-
perty and for me to convey it direc-
tly to Mr. Kohler and they would 
handle the warranty deeds themselves, 
which wouldn't change my basic program. 
Q. So that you were still going to be 
obligated to give that Howell property 
free and clear? 
A. True. 
Q. That was your understanding, that it was 
to be free and clear, wasn't it? 
A. True. 
Q. And you weren't to get any cash back or 
anything else? 
A. That's right. 
Q. I suppose it was fairly clear in your 
mind that under the transaction between 
Kohler and Robinson, Robinson was going 
to convey or arrange the conveyance of 
the Howell property to the Kohlers? 
A. That was true. 
Q. And that was going to be as an absolute 
conveyance and not a mortgage? 
A. That's true. (Tr. 23). 
The nature of the transfer itself indicates that an 
absolute conveyance was intended* The property was trans-
ferred by warranty deed and there was no competent evidence 
that it was meant to be something else. In Bybee v. Stuart, 
112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948), the grantor executed a 
warranty deed, absolute in form, in return for the grantee's 
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premises to advance moneys necessary to pay off certain 
creditors who were about to foreclose on his land. Con-
temporaneous with the deed, and as part of the same trans-
action, an agreement was entered into whereby the grantee 
consented to reconvey the property upon the payment of the 
indebtedness. Under these particular circumstances the 
court properly held an absolute conveyance was not intended. 
The court did, however, comment on the nature of title gen-
erally transferred by virtue of a warranty deed: 
It is true, of course, that a warranty deed, 
absolute in form, is presumed to convey a 
fee simple title, or at least whatever title 
the grantor has." 189 P.2d at 122. 
A court in equity may show by parol evidence that a 
deed absolute on its face was given for security purposes 
only if the evidence is clear, definite, unequivocal and 
conclusive. Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Garley, 105 
Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943); Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 
25 P.2d 940 (1933); Northcrest Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust 
Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952). With respect to the 
standard and quality of evidence required to establish an 
oral trust the following language from Chambers v. Emery, 
13 Utah 374, 45 Pac. 192, 195 (1896) has been cited frequently 
by this court: 
In such event the proof must be strong, 
clear, and convincing, such as to leave no 
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doubt of the existence of the trust. Such 
a case is similar to one where it is attemp-
ted to convert a deed absolute into a mort-
gage/ or where the reformation of a written 
instrument is sought on the ground of accident, 
mistake, or fraud. In all such cases the 
court will scrutinize parol evidence with 
great caution, and the plaintiff must fail un-
less it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and 
conclusive. Public policy, and the safety 
and security of titles to real estate, demand 
this rule, because such evidence is offered 
to overcome the strong presumption, arising 
from the terms and conditions of an instrument 
in writing, which is always the best evidence 
of title. If it were once established that 
the effect of the terms of a written instrument 
could be avoided by a bare preponderance of 
parol evidence, the gates to perjury would 
soon be wide open, and no person could longer 
rest in the security of his title to property, 
however solemn might be the instrument on 
which it was founded. 45 Pac. at 195. 
In Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594 
(1961) , the father transferred property to his daughter by 
an outright conveyance subject to life estates for him and 
his wife. After their death the plaintiff sons alleged 
the conveyance was in safekeeping for all the children. 
There was conflicting testimony as to the father1s actual 
intent. The court relied on the absolute nature of the 
deed in holding for the daughter: 
The transfer of his home by the father 
to Ethel was made by a deed absolute, subject 
only to the life estates, and the authorities 
are practically uniform to the point that to 
justify a court in determining from oral testi-
mony that a deed which purports to convey land 
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absolutely in fee simple was intended to be 
something different, such as a trust, such 
testimony must be clear and convincing. The 
proof must be something more than the modicum 
of evidence which this court sometimes holds 
to be sufficient to warrant a finding where 
the matter is not so serious as the overthrow 
of a clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed 
and delivered. 366 P.2d at 597. 
Appellants allege that the Kohlers were to hold the 
deed to the Howell property and all instruments in trust 
until the deal was consummated. This allegation is con-
trary to the express terms of the warranty deed and has not 
been shown by a preponderance, let alone by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The evidence establishes that the Kohlers 
received an absolute title to the subject property, and 
thereafter, Mr. Hansen gave him the keys to the home on the 
premises, did not challenge Kohlerfs right to put a tenant 
in possession and retain the rents, and even delivered tax 
notices on the property to the Kohlers for payment. 
The agreement of June 12, 1969 (Exhibit 8), provides 
expressly that the conveyance to the Kohlers is to be part 
of the down payment. Mr. Hansen read the agreement before 
he signed it (Tr. 28). He was knowledgeable about deeds 
and mortgages (Tr. 21) . 
It is finally contended that subsequent to June 12, 
1969, Kohler agreed to sell the property for Mr. Hansen 
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and to work out a settlement. Any such agreement could 
not establish a trust relationship. In Skeen v. Marriott, 
22 Utah 73, 61 Pac. 296 (1900) the court stated: 
* * * nor are declarations of a purpose 
to create a trust, or mere voluntary promises 
to give property to a person or persons, or to 
dispose of it in the future for the benefit 
of such person or persons, when such promises 
remain unfulfilled, sufficient to create a 
trust, or any right which a court of equity 
will enforce. Nor is a mere intention or 
mere voluntary agreement to create a trust, 
where the owner of the property contemplates 
some further action by him to make it effectual, 
sufficient to establish a trust. 61 Pac. at 300. 
And in Hansen v. Hansen, 110 Utah 222, 171 P.2d 392 
(1946) the court quoted the following from Breach on Trusts 
and Trustees, Sec. 52: 
In the creation of a trust in personalty, 
as well as in real estate, the language employed 
must be definite and positive. * * * In addi-
tion to this, the proof of the trust must be un-
equivocal. The declaration of a purpose to create 
a trust is of no value, and a promise to make a 
donation at some future time, where there is no 
consideration, at best is only an imperfect gift, 
and will not be upheld as a trust. 171 Pac. 21 
at 397. 
The only testimony offered was that of Marvin Hansen. 
Plaintiffs did not call Kent Robinson, with whom the contract 
was made. 
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POINT II 
ANY MODIFICATION OF THE APRIL 2, 1969, WARRANTY 
DEED WAS REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING. 
For the purpose of the original transaction, the Howell 
property was valued at $7,500.00 and constituted Hansen's 
down payment on the purchase of the Robinson four-plex. 
When it was subsequently discovered the property was en-
cumbered by a $19,000.00 mortgage the property no longer was 
an adequate down payment and something else had to be done 
to assure performance of the contract. Jfir. Hansen testi-
fied: 
Q. And when that occurred [discovery of the 
mortgage] it looked like your deal with 
Mr. Robinson wasn't going to go through, 
didn't it? 
A. Well, we had to do something, that was 
obvious. 
The parties then agreed that Robinson, in addition to 
the Howell property, would accept as further down payment 
Hansen's 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile. This agreement 
was set forth in the June 12, 1969, supplemental agreement 
which also contained the following provision: 
Buyers agree to transfer title to home 
and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S. 
Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife. War-
ranty Deed was executed 1 April, 1969. 
* * * 
Buyers and sellers agree that this to-
gether with other terms defined in said con-
tract constitutes the down payment. 
As of April 2, 1969, there is no dispute that the 
Kohlers held title to the Kohler property in fee simple 
absolute. To subsequently divest the Kohlers of this 
interest would require a written surrender subscribed to 
by the Kohlers. Section 25-5-5 Utah Code Annotated pro-
vides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surren-
dered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating, gran-
ting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto author-
ized by writing. 
The June 12, 1969, agreement does not on its face pur-
port to divest in any manner the absolute nature of the 
Kohlers' interest in the Howell property. Rather, this 
agreement makes specific reference to the April 1, 1969, 
warranty deed and confirms its terras. Nothing in either 
the warranty deed or June 12, 1969, agreement substantiates 
appellants1 contention that the Kohlers held the property 
in trust until the real estate commission was paid. 
The trial court found that any agreements made subse-
quent to June 12, 1969, respecting reconveyance of the 
Howell property to appellants were too vague and uncertain, 
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were oral, and were without consideration. In Bybee v. 
Stuart, supra, this court held an oral surrender of an 
interest in property is ineffectual under the Statute of 
Frauds under circumstances similar to the case at bar. 
The court stated: 
[D]efendant testified to a conversation 
between himself and his brother, Oni, by which 
it is claimed Oni orally surrendered to defen-
dant any interest he had in the property. The 
court found that such a conversation did take 
place, and his finding is cross-assigned as 
error by the appellees. However, the court 
found that this purported surrender was inef-
fectual under the Statute of Frauds - Sees. 
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, U.C.A., 1943. Defendant 
contends that Oni Stuart's oral surrender of 
his interest in the premises was valid. 
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon ap-
pellees] cross-assignment of error, since we 
are of the opinion that even if such conversa-
tion took place as was testified to by defen-
dant, it was within the Statute of Frauds and 
therefore unenforceable. 189 P.2d at 122. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINES OF RESULTING OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARE 
NOT APPLICABLE. 
Appellants in their brief rely on the equitable prin-
ciples of a resulting or constructive trust to compel the 
Kohlers to either reconvey the Howell property or to pay 
appellants the difference between the $7,500.00 "value" of 
the property and Mr. Kohler's commission. Reliance on these 
doctrines is unfounded, however, as the factual circumstances 
of this case preclude their applicability. 
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Section 404 of Restatement 2d, Trusts, indicates 
these circumstances in which resulting trusts arise: 
A resulting trust arises where a person makes 
or causes to be made a disposition of property 
under circumstances which raise an inference 
that he does not intend that the person taking 
or holding the property should have the benefi-
cial interest therein, unless the inference is 
rebutted or the beneficial interest is other-
wise effectively disposed of. 
There are three situations where a resulting trust may 
arise: (1) where a private or charitable trust fails in 
whole or in part; (2) where a private or charitable trust 
is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; and 
(3) where property is purchased and the purchase price is 
paid by one person and at his direction the vendor transfers 
the property to another person. Restatement 2df Trusts, 
Chapter 12, General Principles. None of the situations above-
described are present in the instant case and it is therefore 
improper to consider this case under a resulting trust theory. 
In order to establish a constructive trust there must 
be some fraudulent or unfair and unconscionable conduct in 
the transaction by which the trustee acquires the property 
rendering it inequitable for the trustee to retain absolute 
title. 89 C.J.S., Trusts, §139. In certain situations 
where a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties 
the courts in equity will presume fraud. In Hawkins v. Perry, 
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123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953)f the court observed: 
Equity imposes a constructive trust to pre-
vent one from unjustly profiting through 
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed 
under a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship. 253 P.2d at 375. 
In Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364, 
49 P.2d 403 (1935), the court commented: 
It is true that, upon the establish-
ment of certain fiduciary relationship and 
transactions between the parties to that 
relationship, equity will presume fraud, 
the abuse of confidence, and place the bur-
den of proving good faith and fairness upon 
the dominant party in the relationship. 
In such cases the presumption of fraud may 
be based upon the relationship alone and 
relieves the party from proving the fraud, 
but the fraud is nevertheless an essential 
element. By the presumption equity supplies 
that element. The relationships wherein 
such presumption has been indulged are par-
ent and child, principal and agent, attorney 
and client, guardian and ward, executor or 
administrator and heir, beneficiary or dis-
tributee. In other cases the presumption of 
fraud has been given effect when there has 
been a relationship of confidence plus other 
circumstances tending to show that some ad-
vantage had been taken by the dominant party 
with a consequent abuse of confidence. 49 
P.2d at 404. 
In Renshaw the court had to determine whether a relationship 
of employer and employee alone would raise a presumption of 
fraud in a transaction where the employee loaned the employer 
some money. The court held the mere employee-employer rela-
tionship, standing alone, would not raise the presumption 
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of fraud and that facts establishing such an abuse of con-
fidence placed as would warrant fraud would have to be 
shown. The court stated: 
It is not every relationship to which the 
term "fiduciary" or "confidential" might be 
applied with some degree of reason or plausi-
bility that will authorize, by itself alone, 
the creation of the presumption of fraud in 
the dealings between each other of those oc-
cupying that relationship* Every business 
transaction involves a certain amount of con-
fidence and trust. Equity will not discourage 
transactions by creating presumptions of their 
fraudulent nature, except in those cases where 
the transactions occur between parties to re-
lationships which by their very nature it is 
the policy of the law to protect one of the 
parties thereto on the theory that they are 
not dealing on an equal basis because of the 
confidence which one party to the relationship 
is presumed to have in the other. See Perry 
on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.) §194? 2 Pom-
eroy's Eq. Juris. (4th Ed.) §§955, 956. It 
is always a question, therefore, of the actual 
relationship between the parties that must be 
inquired into, and not whether the terms "fi-
duciary," "confidential," or "trust" can, with 
some degree of reason, be applied to the rela-
tionship. 49 P.2d at 404. 
In Bradbury v. Rassmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 
710 (1965), the plaintiffs brought an action to declare null 
and void a warranty deed, a lease agreement, and a transfer 
of water stock certificates to their niece and her husband. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant represented the trans-
action to be a sale of the farm and water stock when the 
documents, in fact, purported to make a gift of such property. 
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The court held the confidence and trust which plaintiffs 
had in the defendants was not sufficient to establish such 
a confidential relationship as would raise a presumption 
of unfairness in the transaction or a finding of undue in-
fluence. The court stated: 
The relationship must be such as would 
lead an ordinarily prudent person in 
the management of his business affairs 
to repose that degree of confidence in the 
other party which largely results in the 
substitution of the will of the latter for 
that of the former in the material matters 
involved in the transaction. The doctrine 
of confidential relationship rests upon the 
principle of inequality between the parties, 
and implies a position of superiority oc-
cupied by one of the parties over the other. 
Mere confidence in one person by another 
is not sufficient alone to constitute such 
a relationship. The confidence must be re-
posed by one under such circumstances as to 
create a corresponding duty, either legal or 
moral, upon the part of the other to observe 
the confidence, and it must result in a situa-
tion where as a matter of fact there is super-
ior influence on one side and dependence on 
the other. 401 P.2d at 713. 
This crux of this case is an attempt to show that docu-
ments are not really what they purport to be. The resulting 
trust doctine is inapplicable because the factual context 
of the case is wholly inconsistent with the circumstances 
under which resulting trusts are derived. The constructive 
trust doctrine is equally inapplicable as an essential pre-
requisite to establishment of a constructive trust is a 
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showing of fraud or a fiduciary relationship which has been 
betrayed. 
Mr. Kohler was never employed by Mr. Hansen to represent 
him in the subject transaction but was acting as a broker 
for the Robinsons. Mr. Kohler occupied a fiduciary relation-
ship to the Robinsons, Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119f 329 
P.2d 410 (1958)f but not to the Hansens. A real estate 
broker does not ordinarily represent both parties to a trans-
action. 61-2-11(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953. The trans-
action between the Kohlers and the Robinsons was an arms 
length transaction; and after April 2, 1969, Mr. Hansen knew 
the Kohlers were dealing in their own behalf with respect 
to the Howell property. Assuming a confidential relationship 
ever existed, the relationship would have terminated on 
April 2, 1969, when the warranty deed conveying the Howell 
property was transferred, and did not exist at the time of 
the June 12, 1969, transaction. The facts do not raise any 
presumption of fraud or unfairness in the transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hansens conveyed the Howell property to the Kohlers 
by warranty deed. Mr. Hansen was aware of both the nature 
and consequences of such a conveyance, and clearly intended 
to divest himself of all incidents of ownership in the sub-
ject property. While the parties are in disagreement as to 
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the nature of the title held by the Kohlers after the dis-
covery of the encumbrance on the Howell property the deci-
sion of the trial court should be affirmed on two grounds: 
(1) the appellants have failed to prove by clear and convin-
cing evidence that the warranty deed was meant as a security 
instrument rather than an outright transfer of property, and 
(2) to change what was formerly a clear transfer of property 
to a security instrument would have to be in writing and 
subscribed to by the Kohlers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
St 
i£,yC-^ ^SCXxt^^ 
e/E. 
AND ] 
Bryc E. Roe 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARVIN W. HANSEN and 
BEVERLY M. HANSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
REUEL S. KOHLER and 
DOLORES M. KOHLER, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
EARSEL G. PIERCE and 
PATRICIA B. PIERCE, his wife, 
Intervening Defendants 
and Cross Claimants. 
Case No. 14099 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS KOHLER 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to compel reconveyance of real pro-
perty previously deeded to respondents Kohler, or to recover 
its net value, on the ground that the conveyance to the 
Kohlers was as security only. Intervening defendants sought 
damages from the Kohlers for breach of warranty, and against 
the plaintiffs for slander of title. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial, the court dismissed the action and the 
breach of warranty claim; and held plaintiffs liable for 
damages to the intervenors. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL * 
Respondents Reuel S. and Dolores M. Kohler seek 
affirmance of the judgment. f 
m 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
. f 
Respondent Reuel S. Kohler is a licensed real estate | 
broker. In February, 1969, Kohler acted as broker for Kent „ 
Robinson in the sale of a four-plex in Salt Lake City. By 
the terms of an Earnest Money Agreement of February 28, 1 
1969 (Exhibit 1), plaintiff Marvin W. Hansen agreed to pur-
I 
chase the four-plex for the price of $39#400.00, with a | 
down payment of $7,500.00 represented by a conveyance of -
. I 
Hansen's home and land in Howell, Utah. Hansen further '• 
agreed to pay the present mortgage of $200.00 per month, 1 
I 
$110.00 per month on Robinsons1 equity and a$2,000.00 
1 
balloon payment on or before May 15, 1969. Kohler was to | 
receive a six percent commission ($2,364.00) from Robinson , 
for his services. 
Thereafter, on April 1, 1969, a Uniform Real Estate p 
l 
Contract (Exhibit 2) was entered into between the Hansens 
l 
and Robinsons containing the same essential terms included ^ 
in the Earnest Money Agreement. p 
Mr. Robinson desired to sell the four-plex but did not i 
want the Howell property. The Robinsons and Kohlers § 
therefore entered into a collateral agreement whereby the 
Kohlers would receive the Howell property in exchange for 
Mr. Kohler's agreement to waive the real estate commission 
and to pay Robinson $2,000.00 (Tr. 23, Exhibit 6). 
On April 2, 1969, in furtherance of that agreement, 
the Hansens executed a warranty deed (Exhibit 3) conveying 
the Howell property to the Kohlers. Robinson understood that 
the conveyance was to transfer the property to the Kohlers 
absolutely (Tr. 23) . 
Subsequently, a title search disclosed that the Howell 
property was subject to a $19,000.00 mortgage (Tr. 13, 23, 
36), and it was necessary to make some changes in the trans-
action. On April 28, 1969, a supplemental agreement (Ex-
hibit 7) was executed. The Hansens agreed to pre-pay to the 
Robinsons $1,000.00 of the $2,000.00 due on May 15, 1969, 
to manifest their good faith. On June 12, 1969, the Hansens 
and Robinsons signed another agreement (Exhibit 8) , intended 
to amend the April 1, 1969, contract as to the manner of the 
down payment: 
1.• Sellers agree to accept as part of 
down payment a 1967 Ford Thunderbird auto-
mobile. Buyer agrees to pay any and all 
indebtedness off against said vehicle, and 
transfer clear title to sellers. 
2. Buyers agree to transfer title to 
home and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S. 
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Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife. 
Warranty deed was executed 1 April 1969. 
3. It is considered that Mr. Hansen 
has made the May payment of $310.00. 
Buyers and sellers agree that this to-
gether with other terms defined in said 
contract constitutes the down payment. 
Notwithstanding this agreement, the Hansens claimed that 
the conveyance to the Kohlers was only as security for the 
real estate commission (Tr* 30). The claim, however, is 
contrary to the evidence presented by Mr. Hansen. 
After the transaction, the parties1 conduct was consis-
tent with an absolute conveyance, but inconsistent with a 
mortgage. 
There was no note to evidence an obligation to pay the 
real estate commission (Tr. 30); no discussion of interest 
on the obligation (Tr. 31); no time for payment was agreed 
upon (Tr. 31); the Kohlers were given possession of the pro-
perty (Tr. 32); they put a tenant in the property and were 
permitted to collect the rents (Tr. 35); and tax notices 
received by the Hansens were delivered to the Kohlers for 
payment (Tr. 34) . 
The Kohlers conveyed the property to Earsel G. Pierce 
and Patricia B. Pierce, the intervening defendants and cross 
claimants herein, on October 18, 1971 (Exhibit 12). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTY DEED TRANSFERRING THE HOWELL PROPERTY TO 
THE KOHLERS WAS NOT INTENDED AS A SECURITY INSTRUMENT. 
The crucial factor in determining whether the con-
veyance of the Howell property to the Kohlers was absolute 
or as security is the intention of the parties at the time 
of execution and delivery of the warranty deed. Kjar v. 
Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972). The undisputed 
testimony of Mr. Hansen indicates the absolute nature of the 
transfer: 
Q: When you first entered into this trans-
action with Robinson, there was no ques-
tion in your mind, was there, that you 
were going to transfer the Howell house? 
A. None whatsoever. 
Q. Absolutely? 
A. True. 
Q. You were to have no interest in that? 
A. Right. (Tr. 22). 
At the time of the transfer the Hansens knew of the 
transaction between the Kohlers and Mr. Robinson under which 
the Kohlers would acquire the Howell property: 
Q. What did they tell you [as to why you were 
conveying the property to Mr. and Mrs. 
Kohler instead of the Robinsons]? 
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A. They told me they had a little deal [ 
of their own pertaining to this pro-
perty and for me to convey it direc- , 
tly to Mr. Kohler and they would 
handle the warranty deeds themselves, * 
which wouldn't change my basic program. 
Q. So that you were still going to be 1 
obligated to give that Howell property 
free and clear? i 
A. True. 
Q. That was your understanding, that it was 
to be free and clear, wasn't it? ' 
A. True. 1 
Q. And you weren't to get any cash back or 
anything else? 1 
i 
i 
A. That's right. 
Q. I suppose it was fairly clear in your 
mind that under the transaction between " 
Kohler and Robinson, Robinson was going 
to convey or arrange the conveyance of | 
the Howell property to the Kohlers? 1 
A. That was true. | 
Q. And that was going to be as an absolute 
conveyance and not a mortgage? I 
A. That's true. (Tr. 23). * 
The nature of the transfer itself indicates that an f 
I 
absolute conveyance was intended. The property was trans-
1 
ferred by warranty deed and there was no competent evidence | 
that it was meant to be something else. In Bybee v. Stuart,
 B 
112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948), the grantor executed a • 
warranty deed, absolute in form, in return for the grantee's I 
premises to advance moneys necessary to pay off certain 
creditors who were about to foreclose on his land. Con-
temporaneous with the deed, and as part of the same trans-
action, an agreement was entered into whereby the grantee 
consented to reconvey the property upon the payment of the 
indebtedness. Under these particular circumstances the 
court properly held an absolute conveyance was not intended. 
The court did, however, comment on the nature of title gen-
erally transferred by virtue of a warranty deed: 
It is true, of course, that a warranty deed, 
absolute in form, is presumed to convey a 
fee simple title, or at least whatever title 
the grantor has." 189 P.2d at 122. 
A court in equity may show by parol evidence that a 
deed absolute on its face was given for security purposes 
only if the evidence is clear, definite, unequivocal and 
conclusive. Thornley Land & Livestock Co. v. Garley, 105 
Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943); Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 
25 P.2d 940 (1933); Northcrest Inc. v. Walker Bank and Trust 
Co., 122 Utah 268, 248 P.2d 692 (1952). With respect to the 
standard and quality of evidence required to establish an 
oral trust the following language from Chambers v. Emery, 
13 Utah 374, 45 Pac. 192, 195 (1896) has been cited frequently 
by this court: 
In such event the proof must be strong, 
clear, and convincing, such as to leave no 
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1 
doubt of the existence of the trust. Such 
a case is similar to one where it is attemp-
ted to convert a deed absolute into a mort- * 
gage, or where the reformation of a written
 t 
instrument is sought on the ground of accident, 
mistake, or fraud. In all such cases the
 ff 
court will scrutinize parol evidence with 
great caution, and the plaintiff must fail un-
less it is clear, definite, unequivocal, and 
conclusive. Public policy, and the safety ' 
and security of titles to real estate, demand i 
this rule, because such evidence is offered 
to overcome the strong presumption, arising J 
from the terms and conditions of an instrument J 
in writing, which is always the best evidence 
of title. If it were once established that * 
the effect of the terms of a written instrument 1 
could be avoided by a bare preponderance of 
parol evidence, the gates to perjury would 
soon be wide open, and no person could longer J 
rest in the security of his title to property, I 
however solemn might be the instrument on 
which it was founded. 45 Pac. at 195. J 
In Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594 
(1961), the father transferred property to his daughter by 
an outright conveyance subject to life estates for him and 
. . . i 
his wife. After their death the plaintiff sons alleged I 
the conveyance was in safekeeping for all the children. 1 
. ' j 
There was conflicting testimony as to the father's actual 
i 
intent. The court relied on the absolute nature of the 
deed in holding for the daughter: 
The transfer of his home by the father 
to Ethel was made by a deed absolute, subject 
only to the life estates, and the authorities 
are practically uniform to the point that to 
justify a court in determining from oral testi-
mony that a deed which purports to convey land 
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absolutely in fee simple was intended to be 
something different, such as a trust, such 
testimony must be clear and convincing. The 
proof must be something more than the modicum 
of evidence which this court sometimes holds 
to be sufficient to warrant a finding where 
the matter is not so serious as the overthrow 
of a clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed 
and delivered. 366 P.2d at 597. 
Appellants allege that the Kohlers were to hold the 
deed to the Howell property and all instruments in trust 
until the deal was consummated. This allegation is con-
trary to the express terms of the warranty deed and has not 
been shown by a preponderance, let alone by clear and con-
vincing evidence. The evidence establishes that the Kohlers 
received an absolute title to the subject property, and 
thereafter, Mr. Hansen gave him the keys to the home on the 
premises, did not challenge Kohler's right to put a tenant 
in possession and retain the rents, and even delivered tax 
notices on the property to the Kohlers for payment. 
The agreement of June 12, 1969 (Exhibit 8), provides 
expressly that the conveyance to the Kohlers is to be part 
of the down payment. Mr. Hansen read the agreement before 
he signed it (Tr. 28). He was knowledgeable about deeds 
and mortgages (Tr. 21) . 
It is finally contended that subsequent to June 12, 
1969, Kohler agreed to sell the property for Mr. Hansen 
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and to work out a settlement. Any such agreement could 
not establish a trust relationship. In Skeen v. Marriott, 
22 Utah 73, 61 Pac. 296 (1900) the court stated: 
" * * * nor are declarations of a purpose 
to create a trust, or mere voluntary promises 
to give property to a person or persons, or to 
dispose of it in the future for the benefit 
of such person or persons, when such promises 
remain unfulfilled, sufficient to create a 
trust, or any right which a court of equity 
will enforce. Nor is a mere intention or 
mere voluntary agreement to create a trust, 
where the owner of the property contemplates 
some further action by him to make it effectual, 
sufficient to establish a trust. 61 Pac. at 300. 
And in Hansen v. Hansen, 110 Utah 222, 171 P.2d 392 
(1946) the court quoted the following from Breach on Trusts 
and Trustees, Sec. 52: 
In the creation of a trust in personalty, 
as well as in real estate, the language employed 
must be definite and positive. * * * In addi-
tion to this, the proof of the trust must be un-
equivocal. The declaration of a purpose to create 
a trust is of no value, and a promise to make a 
donation at some future time, where there is no 
consideration, at best is only an imperfect gift, 
and will not be upheld as a trust. 171 Pac. 21 
at 397. 
The only testimony offered was that of Marvin Hansen. 
Plaintiffs did not call Kent Robinson, with whom the contract 
was made. 
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POINT II 
ANY MODIFICATION OF THE APRIL 2, 1969, WARRANTY 
DEED WAS REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING. 
For the purpose of the original transaction, the Howell 
property was valued at $7,500.00 and constituted Hansen's 
down payment on the purchase of the Robinson four-plex. 
When it was subsequently discovered the property was en-
cumbered by a $19,000.00 mortgage the property no longer was 
an adequate down payment and something else had to be done 
to assure performance of the contract. Mr. Hansen testi-
fied: 
Q. And when that occurred [discovery of the 
mortgage] it looked like your deal with 
Mr. Robinson wasn't going to go through, 
didn't it? 
A. Well, we had to do something, that was 
obvious. 
The parties then agreed that Robinson, in addition to 
the Howell property, would accept as further down payment 
Hansen's 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile. This agreement 
was set forth in the June 12, 1969, supplemental agreement 
which also contained the following provision: 
Buyers agree to transfer title to home 
and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S. 
Kohler and Dolores M. Kohler, his wife. War-
ranty Deed was executed 1 April, 1969. 
* * * 
Buyers and sellers agree that this to-
gether with other terms defined in said con-
tract constitutes the down payment. 
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As of April 2, 1969, there is no dispute that the 
Kohlers held title to the Kohler property in fee simple 
absolute. To subsequently divest the Kohlers of this 
interest would require a written surrender subscribed to 
by the Kohlers. Section 25-5-5 Utah Code Annotated pro-
vides: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, 
shall be created, granted, assigned, surren-
dered or declared otherwise than by act or 
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in 
writing subscribed by the party creating, gran-
ting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the 
same, or by his lawful agent thereunto author-
ized by writing. 
The June 12, 1969, agreement does not on its face pur-
port to divest in any manner the absolute nature of the 
Kohlers1 interest in the Howell property. Rather, this 
agreement makes specific reference to the April 1, 1969, 
warranty deed and confirms its terms. Nothing in either 
the warranty deed or June 12, 1969, agreement substantiates 
appellants1 contention that the Kohlers held the property 
in trust until the real estate commission was paid. 
The trial court found that any agreements made subse-
quent to June 12, 1969, respecting reconveyance of the 
Howell property to appellants were too vague and uncertain, 
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were oral, and were without consideration. In Bybee v. 
Stuart, supra, this court held an oral surrender of an 
interest in property is ineffectual under the Statute of 
Frauds under circumstances similar to the case at bar. 
The court stated: 
[D]efendant testified to a conversation 
between himself and his brother, Oni, by which 
it is claimed Oni orally surrendered to defen-
dant any interest he had in the property. The 
court found that such a conversation did take 
place, and his finding is cross-assigned as 
error by the appellees. However, the court 
found that this purported surrender was inef-
fectual under the Statute of Frauds - Sees. 
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, U.C.A., 1943. Defendant 
contends that Oni Stuart's oral surrender of 
his interest in the premises was valid. 
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon ap-
pellees' cross-assignment of error, since we 
are of the opinion that even if such conversa-
tion took place as was testified to by defen-
dant, it was within the Statute of Frauds and 
therefore unenforceable. 189 P.2d at 122. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINES OF RESULTING OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARE 
NOT APPLICABLE. 
Appellants in their brief rely on the equitable prin-
ciples of a resulting or constructive trust to compel the 
Kohlers to either reconvey the Howell property or to pay 
appellants the difference between the $7,500.00 "value" of 
the property and Mr. Kohler's commission. Reliance on these 
doctrines is unfounded, however, as the factual circumstances 
of this case preclude their applicability. 
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Section 404 of Restatement 2d, Trusts, indicates 
these circumstances in which resulting trusts arise: 
A resulting trust arises where a person makes 
or causes to be made a disposition of property 
under circumstances which raise an inference 
that he does not intend that the person taking 
or holding the property should have the benefi-
cial interest therein, unless the inference is 
rebutted or the beneficial interest is other-
wise effectively disposed of. 
There are three situations where a resulting trust may 
arise: (1) where a private or charitable trust fails in 
whole or in part; (2) where a private or charitable trust 
is fully performed without exhausting the trust estate; and 
(3) where property is purchased and the purchase price is 
paid by one person and at his direction the vendor transfers 
the property to another person* Restatement 2d, Trusts, 
Chapter 12, General Principles. None of the situations above-* 
described are present in the instant case and it is therefore 
improper to consider this case under a resulting trust theory. 
In order to establish a constructive trust there must 
be some fraudulent or unfair and unconscionable conduct in 
the transaction by which the trustee acquires the property 
rendering it inequitable for the trustee to retain absolute 
title. 89 C.J.S., Trusts, §139. In certain situations 
where a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties 
the courts in equity will presume fraud. In Hawkins v. Perry, 
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123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953), the court observed: 
Equity imposes a constructive trust to pre-
vent one from unjustly profiting through 
fraud or the violation of a duty imposed 
under a fiduciary or confidential relation-
ship. 253 P.2d at 375. 
In Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364, 
49 P.2d 403 (1935), the court commented: 
It is true that, upon the establish-
ment of certain fiduciary relationship and 
transactions between the parties to that 
relationship, equity will presume fraud, 
the abuse of confidence, and place the bur-
den of proving good faith and fairness upon 
the dominant party in the relationship. 
In such cases the presumption of fraud may 
be based upon the relationship alone and 
relieves the party from proving the fraud, 
but the fraud is nevertheless an essential 
element. By the presumption equity supplies 
that element. The relationships wherein 
such presumption has been indulged are par-
ent and child, principal and agent, attorney 
and client, guardian and ward, executor or 
administrator and heir, beneficiary or dis-
tributee. In other cases the presumption of 
fraud has been given effect when there has 
been a relationship of confidence plus other 
circumstances tending to show that some ad-
vantage had been taken by the dominant party 
with a consequent abuse of confidence. 49 
P.2d at 404. 
In Renshaw the court had to determine whether a relationship 
of employer and employee alone would raise a presumption of 
fraud in a transaction where the employee loaned the employer 
some money. The court held the mere employee-employer rela-
tionship, standing alone, would not raise the presumption 
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of fraud and that facts establishing such an abuse of con-
i 
fidence placed as would warrant fraud would have to be 
! 
shown. The court stated: | 
It is not every relationship to which the j 
term "fiduciary" or "confidential" might be I 
applied with some degree of reason or plausi-
bility that will authorize, by itself alone, 
the creation of the presumption of fraud in 1 
the dealings between each other of those oc- • 
cupying that relationship. Every business 
transaction involves a certain amount of con- 1 
fidence and trust. Equity will not discourage J 
transactions by creating presumptions of their 
fraudulent nature, except in those cases where f 
the transactions occur between parties to re- | 
lationships which by their very nature it is 
the policy of the law to protect one of the 
parties thereto on the theory that they are f 
not dealing on an equal basis because of the ^ 
confidence which one party to the relationship 
is presumed to have in the other. See Perry I 
on Trusts and Trustees (6th Ed.) §194; 2 Pom- « 
eroy's Eq. Juris. (4th Ed.) §§955, 956. It 
is always a question, therefore, of the actual m 
relationship between the parties that must be 
inquired into, and not whether the terms "fi-
duciary," "confidential," or "trust" can, with 
some degree of reason, be applied to the rela-
tionship. 49 P.2d at 404. « 
In Bradbury v. Rassmussen, 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d • 
m 
710 (1965), the plaintiffs brought an action to declare null 
N 
and void a warranty deed, a lease agreement, and a transfer 
of water stock certificates to their niece and her husband. 
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant represented the trans- * 
action to be a sale of the farm and water stock when the I 
' m 
documents, in fact, purported to make a gift of such property, 
« 
• 
i 
i 
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The court held the confidence and trust which plaintiffs 
had in the defendants was not sufficient to establish such 
a confidential relationship as would raise a presumption 
of unfairness in the transaction or a finding of undue in-
fluence. The court stated: 
The relationship must be such as would 
lead an ordinarily prudent person in 
the management of his business affairs 
to repose that degree of confidence in the 
other party which largely results in the 
substitution of the will of the latter for 
that of the former in the material matters 
involved in the transaction. The doctrine 
of confidential relationship rests upon the 
principle of inequality between the parties, 
and implies a position of superiority oc-
cupied by one of the parties over the other. 
Mere confidence in one person by another 
is not sufficient alone to constitute such 
a relationship. The confidence must be re-
posed by one under such circumstances as to 
create a corresponding duty, either legal or 
moral, upon the part of the other to observe 
the confidence, and it must result in a situa-
tion where as a matter of fact there is super-
ior influence on one side and dependence on 
the other. 401 P.2d at 713. 
This crux of this case is an attempt to show that docu-
ments are not really what they purport to be. The resulting 
trust doctine is inapplicable because the factual context 
of the case is wholly inconsistent with the circumstances 
under which resulting trusts are derived. The constructive 
trust doctrine is equally inapplicable as an essential pre-
requisite to establishment of a constructive trust is a 
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showing of fraud or a fiduciary relationship which has been 
betrayed. 
Mr. Kohler was never employed by Mr. Hansen to represent 
him in the subject transaction but was acting as a broker 
for the Robinsons. Mr. Kohler occupied a fiduciary relation-
ship to the Robinsons, Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 
P.2d 410 (1958), but not to the Hansens. A real estate 
broker does not ordinarily represent both parties to a trans-
action. 61-2-11(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953. The trans-
action between the Kohlers and the Robinsons was an arms 
length transaction; and after April 2, 1969, Mr. Hansen knew 
the Kohlers were dealing in their own behalf with respect 
to the Howell property. Assuming a confidential relationship 
ever existed, the relationship would have terminated on 
April 2, 1969, when the warranty deed conveying the Howell 
property was transferred, and did not exist at the time of 
the June 12, 1969, transaction. The facts do not raise any 
presumption of fraud or unfairness in the transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hansens conveyed the Howell property to the Kohlers 
by warranty deed. Mr. Hansen was aware of both the nature 
and consequences of such a conveyance, and clearly intended 
to divest himself of all incidents of ownership in the sub-
ject property. While the parties are in disagreement as to 
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the nature of the title held by the Kohlers after the dis-
covery of the encumbrance on the Howell property the deci-
sion of the trial court should be affirmed on two grounds: 
(1) the appellants have failed to prove by clear and convin-
cing evidence that the warranty deed was meant as a security 
instrument rather than an outright transfer of property, and 
(2) to change what was formerly a clear transfer of property 
to a security instrument would have to be in writing and 
subscribed to by the Kohlers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce/E. Roe 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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